Jonathan Silk not only studies Mahāyāna Buddhism; he thinks about it as well. Is that unusual? Put it this way: I feel that I can recommend his work on that basis alone.
- A number of Prof. Silk’s articles are available at the University of Leiden’s online repository.
- For starters: timely thoughts on Buddhist studies in his Oratie, Lies, Slander and the Study of Buddhism, delivered April 1st, 2008 (but no laughing matter). Offering so much to discuss, I present just this excerpt:
I would be a happy man had I a nickel — that’s a small denomination American coin – for every time I have been told that Buddhism is not a religion, but rather a philosophy, a way of life. This is more than a rhetorical strategy by which an interested Westerner allows himself to explore Buddhism without feeling an apostate for doing so. For it derives its validity only by denying Buddhist traditions their intrinsic identity, and Buddhists — traditional, Asian Buddhists — their autonomy. Once one denies that Buddhism is a religion, it ceases to be an integral part of anyone’s life. Buddhism becomes something optional, adventitious, incidental even to the people whose lives it structures. For Westerners disaffected with religion, this may be a happy solution. But at least for the scholar, it is an impossibility, for it constitutes a refusal to acknowledge the tradition in its multiplicity and complexity, or even in its most intrinsic nature. [2008:12]
- Official Site: http://www.leidenuniv.nl/professoren/show_en.php3-medewerker_id=950.htm
I’m not so sure about Silk’s argument here, it all seems a little too cute by half. On the one hand he seems to be trying to appropriate Foulcauldian ideas about “discourses of power”. Apparently westerners appropriate a discourse of power (scil. “Buddhism is a philosophy and not a religion”) to deny Buddhists their autonomy (presumably he refers to “autonomy” in the political sense akin to that used by Foucault vis a vis structurally oppressed social groups) . Then the contention is made that once denied as a religion, Buddhism ceases to be an integral part of anyone’s life. The problem with this analysis is that it is based on flawed premises –
1. Buddhist traditions have an “intrinsic” identity.
If Silk had gone deeper into his Foucault and Derrida, he would have been acutely aware of the danger of essentialising the “other”. What is the intrinsic identity of Japanese Buddhism? What is the intrinsic identity of Zen? What is the intrinsic identity of sOtO Zen etc etc… The positing of essential identities of human modes of behaviour and traditions is a pointless hermeutical exercise which has been discarded in anthropology, sociology and the rest of the human sciences
2. A philosophical tradition cannot be an integral part of a human life.
Even the most cursory encounter with a revolutionary Marxist would have demonstrated to Silk the utter foolishness of his assumption.
3. Asian Buddhists who view their Buddhism as a philosophy rather than a religion have little heuristic value for the western scholar.
Clearly this assumption seeks to disempower the voices of modern asian Buddhist believers and scholars who view the traditions they study and identify with in those terms. As many asian countries adopt rapid industrialisation and economic liberalisation, these voices have become stronger. To deny them their ability to decide to interprete their own traditions in philosophical rather than religious terms can have a soft power imperialistic effect.
Professor Silk’s is a very strong philologist but I am very suspect when read what he writes about how “western” scholars *should* analyse Buddhist traditions and history. Misappropriating analysis techniques from other disciplines to draw political conclusions seems to be a trap that philologists are prone to falling into in order for their arcane area of study to seem “more relevant” in the modern academy.
>1. Buddhist traditions have an “intrinsic” identity.
Of course Buddhists have an identity. The fact that they deny that any absolute value attaches to identity does not mean that they have no social, institutional or sectarian identity. Rejecting the identity that everyone else believes in is precisely what gives them one.
Because there is a certain minimum that Buddhists are obliged to do or (dis)believe in order to be Buddhist, I have no problem with discussing an “intrinsic” identity, as long as it is understood to be as provisional as any other kind of identity. (The wording might be intended as provocative. If it is, it misunderstands that Buddhists are perfectly capable of recognising entities which can be regarded as fixed, “intrinsic”, for the sake of worldly affairs, while being considered ultimately transient.)
>2. A philosophical tradition cannot be an integral part of a human life.
That depends on how you distinguish philosophy and religion. If you are content to say that Buddhism is a philosophy in that it belongs entirely to the realm of the ideal and principled, by definition it ceases to have any direct connection with everyday life. I don’t think anyone would want to argue that Marxism is “just” a philosophy and not at the same time a politics, a history, an economics, and so on. This is Silk’s point, if I’m not mistaken.
As for 3), not quite sure that Silk’s argument is coming through in your summary, or whether you are seeing too much postmodernity in it. There can’t be many who study Buddhism in depth and also have a great deal of time for Foucault and pals.
Surely, revolutionary Marxism is a religion.
I.S.,
“Of course Buddhists have an identity. The fact that they deny that any absolute value attaches to identity does not mean that they have no social, institutional or sectarian identity. Rejecting the identity that everyone else believes in is precisely what gives them one.”
I entirely agree. I think you are arguing a strawman. My point is that it is actually a fruitless exercise to talk about the “intrinsic” identity of any religious, philosophical, political (etc etc) tradition. Humans are very diverse creatures and “traditions” are changing and malleable things open to multifarious insider and outsider interpretations. To use a local example from outside the area of religion, prior to the 1970s and for longer than half of its lifespan, the ALP supported the White Australia policy – should we then conclude that the ALP tradition is intrinsically racist? Can we now conclude that in the post-Whitlam era, the ALP tradition is intrinsically anti-racist and racism is intrinsically absent from its immigration policy…? Clearly not! This is why sociologists and anthropologists have warned of the problem of essentialism in the human sciences.
“That depends on how you distinguish philosophy and religion. If you are content to say that Buddhism is a philosophy in that it belongs entirely to the realm of the ideal and principled, by definition it ceases to have any direct connection with everyday life.”
Is there any evidence that any self-professed Buddhist who purports Buddhism to be a philosophy rather than a religion actually holds the view you enunciated above or is this a strawman? I’m also in disagreement with your assertion that a philosophical system might have no direct connection with daily life. Many philosophical systems have at their heart a close and direct connection with daily life (eg humanitarianism).
“I don’t think anyone would want to argue that Marxism is “just” a philosophy and not at the same time a politics, a history, an economics, and so on. This is Silk’s point, if I’m not mistaken.”
Some Marxists would separate the practice of politics and the history of those who professed Marxism from the theoretical basis behind Marxism itself. To some (many?) Marxists, what is vitally important as an object of study is the theoretical viewpoint of Marxism itself rather than its history etc. Again, these diversity of views is why we should AVOID essentialising Buddhists or Marxists!
In terms of 3), I could be wrong but I suspect that much of Silk’s reading of postmodernism and deconstructionism came about during the formation of his book “Riven by Lust”. I think that what Silk is trying to do in his Oratie is demonstrate that he has a somewhat unique hermeneutical insight to bear on Buddhist traditions and he is trying to employ Foulcauldian and Derridan ideas (eg. autonomism, rhetorical strategies, political deconstruction of authorial intent etc) to that aim. I think he misunderstands the theory he is seeking to appropriate and I think he opens up a real methodological can of worms in seeking to refute claims that relating to “Buddhism as religion” vs “Buddhism as Philosophy” – especially in the face of emerging asian modernity…!
Finally, in terms of revolutionary Marxism as religion, certainly it’s the case that the adherents deny this vehemently. Should we accept their insider perspective or as outsiders should we impose an identification on them?? Personally, as a free-market liberal, I couldn’t possibly comment… 😛
>My point is that it is actually a fruitless exercise to talk about the “intrinsic” identity of any religious, philosophical, political (etc etc) tradition.
If you want to apprehend anything, whether it be a spoon or an idea, it has to be regarded as possessing a certain degree of fixity or essence. That doesn’t mean that it should not simultaneously be regarded an entity in flux, if you want to avoid some grief.
But I’m repeating myself here (and potentially elsewhere). In future I will require that comments be short and get to the point.
>Is there any evidence that any self-professed Buddhist who purports Buddhism to be a philosophy rather than a religion actually holds the view you enunciated
That is Silk’s suggestion, and although I don’t know exactly who he has in mind, I don’t doubt that some Western self-styled Buddhists conceive of Buddhism as quite inconsequential. Extremely strange “Buddhism without Beliefs”-type views are spread by faux-Buddhists in places like the United Kingdom. If you are a Buddhist, you have to believe in something (karma and rebirth, at minimum); otherwise you are nothing more than a non-theist with a misplaced Buddha fetish.
>I think that what Silk is trying to do in his Oratie is demonstrate that he has a somewhat unique hermeneutical insight to bear on Buddhist traditions […]
I don’t see that as a major concern in Silk’s work. Rather, I see that he uses his privileged position constructively, focusing on the sources and on the functioning of Indian Buddhism without obvious malice in a way that is increasingly rare. That’s enough to warrant a mention here, whether or not I agree with everything.